Introduction by Croakey: More than 5,000 little penguins at Phillip Island and St Kilda in Victoria are expected to be vaccinated against H5 bird flu as part of a national vaccine rollout to priority native bird species.
The national vaccination program, announced yesterday by the Federal Government following trials, will focus mainly on birds in captivity because of the challenge of administering two doses to wild birds.
However, little penguins usually return to the same colonies and burrows, providing a rare opportunity to vaccinate a wild population and monitor their response over time, according to a Victorian Government statement.
Phillip Island Nature Parks CEO Catherine Basterfield said this was believed to be the world’s largest such vaccination program involving wild birds, “building knowledge that could help protect little penguins and strengthen wildlife disease preparedness both in Australia and internationally”.
Local media are reporting that bird flu may already be in the area.
Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Julie Collins, Minister for the Environment and Water Murray Watt and the Australian Chief Veterinary Officer Dr Beth Cookson yesterday made a joint announcement about the national vaccination program, with a transcript here.
“We’ve been very clear that we cannot stop the H5 bird flu from spreading amongst wild birds, but we can take action to protect the species most at risk and the vaccination is now a part of that response,” said Minister Collins.
She warned that “Australians should expect to see more spread and larger numbers particularly of dead birds and mass mortalities around the country from the H5 bird flu”.
As sick or dead birds or other animals become more common, Collins stressed that members of the public should not touch them. Minister Watt also warned that “very distressing times” were ahead as mass deaths of birds occurred.
Meanwhile, Susi Tegen, CEO of the National Rural Health Alliance (NRHA), says rural and regional Australia will face many consequences from bird flu, and that policy should aim “to prevent a wildlife and agricultural emergency from becoming a rural health, economic, ecological and social crisis”.
“Bird flu should therefore be viewed not only as a biosecurity issue but as a test of Australia’s ability to protect rural communities through timely, integrated and evidence-based action,” she writes below.
Susi Tegen writes:
The H5 bird flu (H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b) seems presently a low direct risk to the general Australian population but a high-consequence One Health threat.
Rural Australia is on the frontline because it contains the farms, wetlands, wildlife colonies, veterinary workforce, food-production systems and communities that would absorb the first and largest impacts, as they do with fires, floods, droughts.
The recent harmful algal bloom and mass fish deaths in South Australia and beyond demonstrated how environmental events can rapidly become public health, economic and community crises when responses are fragmented or indeed, delayed.
Many rural and remote communities, commercial and recreational fishers, tourism operators and First Nations communities expressed concern that their early warnings, coordinated communication and practical support were insufficient as the event escalated.
They do after all live and feel their environment, they are connected to the ebb and flows of nature. People were ignored until six or so months later, when finally city people saw it themselves.
The impacts extended well beyond environmental damage, affecting livelihoods, food security, tourism, mental wellbeing (feeling they could not stop what was happening in their back yards), and public confidence and trust in government decision-making.
Bird flu presents a similar challenge, reinforcing why Australia needs a genuine One Health approach that integrates human, animal and environmental health from the outset.
Waiting until human illness or widespread agricultural impacts occur risks ignoring lessons from the algal bloom, where environmental indicators were present before the broader social and economic consequences became fully apparent.
Early surveillance, transparent communication, rapid interagency coordination and locally led responses are critical to preventing small outbreaks from becoming large-scale emergencies.
For rural Australia, preparedness must start but also extend beyond protecting poultry or wildlife. It requires supporting local health services, veterinarians, environmental agencies, farmers and communities to respond together.
Governments should invest in permanent regional surveillance, clear public communication, and coordinated emergency planning that recognises environmental health as a foundation of community health.
The experience of the algal bloom highlights that delayed action can significantly increase costs, erode public trust and prolong recovery.
Risks to rural communities
Bird flu should therefore be viewed not only as a biosecurity issue but as a test of Australia’s ability to protect rural communities through timely, integrated and evidence-based action.
Farmers, poultry workers, veterinarians, wildlife carers, Traditional Owners and others handling birds or contaminated environments face greater exposure. Immediate priorities include coordinated regional One Health response networks, clear clinical pathways, rapid testing, protective equipment, worker monitoring, mental-health support and locally tailored communication.
Short-term effects could include human infection, occupational injury, anxiety, pressure on rural health services, wildlife deaths and disruption to poultry production.
Longer-term impacts may include persistent harm to mental health due to the stress of livestock and livelihoods being impacted, loss of farm income, reduced trust in authorities, damage to threatened species and increased pandemic risk if the virus adapts further.
Australia has strong national scientific and laboratory expertise, but capability is concentrated in major institutions and cities.
More regional One Health hubs, rural veterinary and public health training, integrated surveillance and permanent funding are needed.
Health services must identify exposed patients, maintain infection control readiness and support responders. Public health advocates should ensure equitable access to equipment, testing, compensation and rural representation. This is where the impact is first and often the greatest.
The wider economic and social consequences could include food security, price increases of basic protein, business closures, tourism losses, workforce disruption, cultural harm, community stigma and substantial government response costs. The key weakness is not expertise, but regional coordination and delivery.
Australia’s national scientific and emergency response capabilities are strong.
The material weakness is the last mile: rural and regional inclusion and coordination, rural workforce capacity, locally trusted communication, integrated health-veterinary-environmental surveillance, and economic and mental health protection for affected communities.
The policy objective should not be limited to preventing human cases, nor having an urban approach. It should be to prevent a wildlife and agricultural emergency from becoming a rural health, economic, ecological and social crisis.
See Croakey’s archive of articles on avian influenza
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